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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Animal Control department of the City of Caldwell, Idaho ("City"), has had ongoing 
issues with John Edwards since 2011. Those issues include combative interactions with animal 
control officers and police officers at Rotary Ponds, as well as: feeding stray cats; littering the 
area with items such as plates, cardboard flats, blankets, and structures made of scrap wood, tin, 
and metal; yelling at other citizens using the parks; and driving in an unsafe manner which 
threatened the safety of other park visitors. In November of 2014, Edwards was observed 
interfering with animal control officers attempting to trap the cats in Rotary Ponds, and again 
driving in an unsafe manner. Edwards engaged in similar conduct at Memorial park. 
Due to the long history of disruptive conduct and Edwards's unwillingness to cooperate 
with the reasonable efforts of the City, it was necessary to serve a trespass notice on Edwards to 
protect the visitors and the animals at the city parks, and to maintain the cleanliness and safety of 
the public areas. Consequently, on June 29, 2015, the City of Caldwell Recreation 
Superintendent, Vinton Howell, sent a letter to Edwards, notifying him that pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 18-7008(A)(8), he was no longer allowed to visit Rotary Ponds or Memorial Park in 
Caldwell, Idaho. R., Vol. I, p. 11. The trespass notice was effective for one year, as authorized by 
Idaho Code § 18-7008(A)(8), which states that the following people are considered to willfolly 
commit trespass: 
Every person, except under landlord-tenant relationship, who, being first notified 
in writing, or verbally by the owner or authorized agent of the owner of real 
property, to immediately depart from the same and who refuses to so depart, or 
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enters 
Edwards was upset about trespass notice, and questioned its validity. In response, 
Joshua Mills, the Caldwell City Prosecutor, wrote a letter to Edwards, dated August 31, 2015, 
explaining the history of misconduct and the need for a trespass notice. R., Vol. I, p. 80. In 
response to Mills's letter, Edwards served Mills with a Summons and Complaint, titled 
"Restraint Order on Notice of No Trespass of June 29th 2015." R., Vol. I, p. 4-13. Mills filed a 
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim upon Which Relief May Be Granted. R., Vol. I, p. 
16-21. Thereafter, Edwards filed various documents with the district court leading up to the 
hearing on the Motion to Dismiss. A status conference was held on January 21, 2016. The 
district court assigned February 18, 2016 as the date for a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss. 
At the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, the district court clarified for Edwards that an 
owner of a property has the right to tell someone else that they are not welcome on the property, 
and that Edwards needed to state some sort of claim against that action since he had failed to do 
so. Tr., Vol. I, p. 12, L. 14-22. The district court found that Mills, as the City's agent, proved to 
be the owner of the property and therefore had the authority under Idaho Code to prohibit an 
individual from entering that property. Tr., Vol. I, p. 14, L. 13-20. Edwards was unable to prove 
a constitutional violation, and in fact did not even state a clear constitutional claim. On February 
24, 2016, the district com1 entered the Order of Dismissal, stating that the Complaint was 
dismissed based on the pleadings, evidence of record, and the oral arguments of the parties. R., 
Vol. I, p. 50. Judgment was entered on April 14, 2016, dismissing the Complaint with prejudice 
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documents with the district court, and then eventually filed this appeal. 
II. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court en in dismissing Edwards' s claim after finding that Mills, as 
an agent of the City of Caldwell, lawfully gave Edwards notice that he was not to enter certain 
City property pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-7008(A)(8), and therefore did not violate 
Edwards's constitutional rights? 
III. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Mills seeks an award of attorney fees and costs for defending against this appeal pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41, and Idaho Code Section 12-121. An award of attorney fees 
on appeal is appropriate where the appeal was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation. East Shoshone Hosp. Dist. v. Nonini, l 09 Idaho 93 7, 712 
P.2d 638 (1985). Such is the case, here, as Edwards has continued to file unnecessary motions 
and documents that have no clear argument or claim for relief. Additionally, Edwards' s 
Appellant Brief failed to identify issues on appeal and includes new or revised claims that he did 
not argue in front of the district comi. The arguments that are decipherable are without 
foundation, as the statute and actions at issue have recently and clearly been addressed by Idaho 
courts. Therefore, Mills is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
Edwards argues that his constitutional rights were violated when Mills sent a letter 
prohibiting Edwards from entering certain City property without permission for a period of one 
year. Where a party claims that his right to due process was violated, the appellate court must 
defer to the trial court's findings of fact, if suppo1ied by substantial evidence. State v. Avelar, 124 
Idaho 317,322,859 P.2d 353,358, (Ct. App. 1993). The appellate court may freely review the 
application of constitutional principles to those facts found. Id. The district court found that the 
facts showed Mills had proper authority to put Edwards on notice that he was not allowed on 
ce1iain City prope1ty for one year, and that this action was constitutional under Idaho Code. 
A. The district court was correct when it dismissed Edwards's claim because Edwards 
was prohibited from entering certain public property due to his nonexpressive 
conduct that is not protected by the Constitution. 
In order to state a claim that either an action or a statute is unconstitutional, a plaintiff 
must state, with supportive facts, that the act or the statute deprived him of some fundamental 
right or constitutional privilege. The United States and Idaho Constitutions contain Due Process 
Clauses that forbid the government from depriving an individual of life, libe1iy, or property 
without due process oflaw. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Idaho Const. ait. I,§ 13. This Comi has 
held that in order to determine whether an individual's due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment were violated, a court must use a two-step analysis that first considers whether the 
individual's threatened interest is a libe1ty or property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 72-73, 28 P.3d 1006, 1015-16 (2001). If the 
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it 
IS This issue with respect to the trespass statute was addressed by the Idaho Comi of 
Appeals in Pentico v. State, where the court considered a First Amendment interest when, 
oursuant to the tresoass statute. £overnrnent emolovees told Pentico he was no lon£er allowed to 
J. .I. ,, .__,, ..l "' "-' 
access the building where the Governor's office was temporarily located. 159 Idaho 350, 354-
56, 360 P.3d 359, 363-65 (Ct. App. 2015). The comi held that Pentico did not show that Idaho 
Code infringed upon a citizen's First Amendment rights because it was his "nonexpressive 
conduct his entry into the third floor of the Borah Building after receiving notice that he was no 
longer authorized to be there not his speech, for which he was punished as a trespasser." Id. 
Because he was not asked to leave solely due to his attempt at exercising his First Amendment 
rights, excluding him from governmental property was warranted. 
The Idaho Comi of Appeals based its decision in Pentico, in part, on Virginia v. Hicks, in 
which case a defendant was given notice not to return to an area that he argued was a public 
forum. 539 U.S. 113, 123 S.Ct. 2191 (2003). Upon his return to the prope1iy, he was arrested and 
charged with trespass. The Supreme Court held, regarding the provision under which Hicks was 
arrested: 
Even assuming the [streets of the area] are a public forum, the notice-bannent rule 
subjects to arrest those who reenter after trespassing and after being warned not to 
return-regardless of whether, upon their return they seek to engage in speech.[ ... ] 
Here, as there, it is Hicks' nonexpressive conduct-his entry in violation of the 
notice-barment rule-not his speech, for which he is punished as a trespasser. 
Id at 123, 123 S.Ct. at 2198-99, 156 L.Ed.2d at 160. 
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parks were public areas. notes that the properties are unfenced, public areas without 
"No Trespassing" signs. While his argument is inconectly based on language from a statute that 
is not at play in this case, the fact that he classifies the prope1iy as open and public may have 
some applicability when analyzing a restriction of liberty with respect to public or governmental 
property. However, Edwards was not prohibited from the property because he was exercising his 
constitutional rights and the City did not approve of the expression. Edwards was littering, 
feeding stray cats, and threatening the safety of park visitors and animals. This conduct is not 
expressive conduct that is protected by the Constitution. Therefore, as held in Pentico and Hicks, 
the exclusion from public property is not a violation of Edwards' s constitutional rights and the 
district court's dismissal of Edwards's claim must be affomed. 
B. The district court was correct when it dismissed Edwards's claim because Idaho 
Code Section 18-7008(A)(8) has been analyzed and found constitutional in its 
application to public property, and Mills acted according to the statute's terms. 
The Idaho Supreme Court held in State v. Korsen that Idaho Code§ 18-7008(A)(8) 
applies to both public and private property, puts the public on notice that the acts outlined in the 
statute are criminal, and does not allow for unbridled discretion in police enforcement. 138 Idaho 
706, 69 P.3d 126 (2003). Therefore, owners of property, or the agents thereof, may act according 
to its tem1s. Additionally, the statute does not require that the owner have any reason for asking 
trespassers to stay off their property. It merely requires that the owner or authorized agent notify 
an individual that he must leave and that "persons so notified and capable of leaving must then 
leave." State v. Missamore, 119 Idaho 27, 31, 803 P .2d 528, 532 (1990). 
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to was unlawful. Edwards, however, was not even charged with trespass under the statute. 
After he received the letter containing notice that he was no longer welcome at certain City 
property, he brought his lawsuit against Mills. Therefore, the notice itself is the issue, and it is 
clear that Vinton Howell and Mills had the authority to give written notice under the statute, as 
they are both authorized agents of the City of Caldwell. Although they were not required to give 
a reason for asking Edwards to stay off the property, they did explain that Edwards had caused 
the City numerous problems. Once Edwards was notified, he was expected to stay away from the 
indicated City parks. Mills acted pursuant to the terms of the statute, and that is all that is 
required. Therefore, the district court's dismissal of Edwards' s claim must be affirmed. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Edwards was prohibited from entering certain public property due to 
nonexpressive conduct, and because Idaho Code § 18-7008(A)(8) has been analyzed and found 
constitutional in its application to public property, and Mills acted according to the statute's 
terms, this Court must affirm the decision of the district court and award attorney fees to Mills. 
DATED this \ U)1h day of December, 2016. 
HAMILTON, MICHAELSON & HILTY, LLP 
lllli1 /Ui(l {u;~ 
MAREN ERICSON 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
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